
A Mode of Commentary Generation in the *Nyāyakandalī*

On the Relationship between the Text and the Meta-text

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“The configuration of texts” is one way of reading a text. This method follows the idea that a particular text for study, which we can name the Small text (S-text), exists as a knot of various relationships tying together groups of other connected texts. These other connected texts are classified into four classes based upon their relationship with the S-text: pre-text, inter-text, para-text, and meta-text. The “pre-text” is a prerequisite for the S-text’s existence. Plot, drafts, proofs, and so on are elements of the pre-text. The “inter-text” stands for the whole text, which is related via quotation with the S-text in a broad sense. The relationship between the S-text and the inter-text, then, is called “inter-textuality.” The “meta-text” is the interpretation assigned to the S-text, and finally, the “para-text” is the collection of other texts by the same author. If only a portion of a text is regarded as the S-text, the rest of the text is regarded as the para-text.¹ Acting as the nucleus for the configuration of other texts, the S-text forms what we can call the Large text (L-text), in cooperation with the other texts.

As Hirano [2007: 219–220] has already mentioned in detail, in classical Indian philosophy, knowledge was conveyed from generation to generation in the form of commentary on the original text.² Noting that the commentary text was one main implement of communication, Hirano [2004] considered the relationship between the commentary texts on the same material in the Vaiśeṣika from the viewpoint of quotation in order to show the genesis of a commentary text. To explain this concretely, Hirano [2004] regarded the *Vyomavati* (Vy) of Vyomaśiva (ca. 900–960),³ a commentary text on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (PDhS) of Praśastapāda (ca. 550–600), as the S-text, and other commentary texts on the PDhS, the *Nyāyakandalī* (NK)

1 On the concept of the constituents of the text, see Matsuzawa [2003: 27–28] and Hirano [2007].

2 When I speak of “the original text,” I mean a text on which the commentary text makes comment.

3 On the date of authors referred to in this paper, see Potter (ed.) [1995a (1970)] [1995b (1977): 9–12]. When I have followed other sources on their dates, I have referred to the sources in the footnotes.

of Śrīdhara (ca. 950–1000) and the *Kiraṇāvālī* (*Kir*) of Udayana (ca. 1050–1100), as the inter-text, and showed the inter-textuality between the S-text and the inter-text.

Bearing the relationship between the S-text and the meta-text in mind, this paper presents an annotated translation of the “chapter of inherence’s (*samavāya*) definition” in the *NK* in order to show the mode of comment utilized in this chapter. The definition of inherence in the *PDhS* is held to be the S-text, and the comment portion on it in the *NK* is considered the meta-text. The definition of inherence in the *PDhS* is as follows:

The relation, which is a cause of the idea ‘[this is] here (this is in that)’, between entities that are incapable of existing separately [and] that stand as the superstratum and the substratum, is inherence.⁴

(*PDhS*, no. 9: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyaya-hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ.*)

Regarding the *NK* as the meta-text, in this paper I have edited the “chapter of the definition of inherence” in the *NK*, using the following printed texts of the *NK*:

- R: *Prāśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) with Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Śrīdhara Bhatta*, edited with Hindi Translation by Durgādhara Jhā, Gaṅgānātha Jhā Granthamālā vol. 1, Varanasi: Research Institute, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1977.
- S: *The Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya with Commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara*, edited by Vindhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 13, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1984.
- O: *Nyāyakandalī being a Commentary on Prāśastapādabhāṣya, with Three Sub-commentaries*, edited by J. S. Jetly and Vasant G. Parikh, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 174, Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1991.

My translation is mainly based upon the S edition, with some reference to the R edition and the O edition.⁵ In translating the *NK* I have consulted three commentaries: the *Ṭippaṇa* of Naracandrasūri, the *Pañjikā* of Rājaśekhara Sūri Maladhārī, and the *Nyāyakusumodgama* of Śiḍila Vommideva. These commentaries are in the O edition of the *NK*. According to Potter (ed.) [1995a (1970)], Naracandrasūri flourished around 1210, and Rājaśekhara Sūri Maladhārī flourished around 1350. He does not mention Śiḍila Vommideva.⁶

The synopsis of the chapter of inherence’s definition in the *NK* is supplied for convenient reference. It was made by myself, in consideration of the contents of the

4 On the translation of inherence’s definition in the *PDhS*, Jhā [1982 (1915): 32] translates it as: “Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained—such relationship being the basis of the idea that ‘this is in that.’”

5 We have complete translations of the *NK* in English and Japanese: Jhā [1982 (1915): 32–35] and Honda [1990: 26–28].

6 On the three commentary texts on the *NK*, see the introduction in the *Nyāyakandalī* (O) and Thakur [2003: 277–280]. Neither mentions the dates of Śiḍila Vommideva.

NK, not shown on the Sanskrit text itself. The synopsis is as follows:

- [1] Entities that are incapable of existing separately (*ayutasiddha*)
 - [1.1] Consideration of separate existence (*yutasiddhi*)
 - [1.2] The relation between eternal entities
- [2] Entities that stand as the superstratum and the substratum (*ādhāryādhārabhūta*)
 - [2.1] The relation between merit and pleasure
 - [2.2] The relation between the ether and a bird
- [3] A cause of the idea ‘this is here’ (*ihapratyayahetu*)
- [4] Entities that are incapable of existing separately (*ayutasiddha*)
 - [4.1] The relation between the bowl and the fruit of jujube
 - [4.2] Objection to the expression *ayutasiddha*
 - [4.3] Answer to the objection
 - [4.4] Difference between inherence and conjunction

Following the classification on the above synopsis, I will present a translation of the chapter of inherence’s definition in the *NK*.

[1] Entities that are incapable of existing separately (*ayutasiddha*)

[1.1] Consideration of separate existence (*yutasiddhi*)⁷

[Prašastapāda] considers the nature of inherence with [the words] “between entities that are incapable of existing separately.” Separate existence (*yutasiddhi*) [means] different existence, different residence [in space], [or] the state, possessed by both of two relata, of residing in respective loci independently of each other.⁸ It (separate existence) is not present between two entities that are incapable of existing separately. This relation between those [two entities] is inherence. For instance, [there is

7 TEXT: ⁽¹⁾*samavāyasya svarūpam*¹) *nirūpayati. ayutasiddhānām iti. yutasiddhiḥ pṛthaksiddhiḥ pṛthagavasthīr ubhayor api sambandhinoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśrayāśrayitevaṃ. sā yayor nāsti tāv ayutasiddhau, tayor sambandhaḥ samavāyah yathā tantupaṭayor. yady api tantavah* ⁽²⁾*paṭavyatirikāśraye*²) *samavayanti, tathāpy ubhayor parasparaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśrayāśrayitevaṃ nāsti, paṭasya tantuṣv evāśrayitevāt. yatra tu dvayor api sambandhinoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa vyatirikāśrayāśrayitevaṃ tatra yutasiddhiḥ yathā tvagindriyaśarīrayor. śarīram hi tvagindriyaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśraye svāvayave samāśritam, tvagindriyam ca śarīraparihāreṇa pṛthagāśraye svāvayave samāśritam,*³) *tenānyor saṃyogo na samavāyah.*

VARIANTS: (1) R, S, *samavāyasvarūpam*; (2) O, *paṭavyatirikāḥ paṭe na*; (3) R, S, omit.

8 In the chapter of fire (*tejas*) in the *NK* as well, separate existence is explained in reference to the argument of parts (*avayavas*) and whole (*avayavin*). See the *NK*, p. 42,4–6: *pṛthagāśrayāśrayitevaṃ yutasiddhiḥ ... pṛthagāśrayāśrayitevaṃ cāvayavāvinor bhinnatve ’pi nāstīti ...* (Separate existence [means] the state [possessed by the relata] of residing in respective loci [...]. And although [the whole and its parts] are different [each other], there is not the state of residing in respective loci between the whole and its parts [...].)

inherence] between the threads and the cloth. Although the threads inhere in a locus other than the cloth (i.e. the fibers of cotton, *aśus*), both [the threads and the cloth] do not reside in respective loci independently of each other, since the cloth resides in the threads only.⁹ On the other hand, where both of two relata reside in respective loci independently of each other, there is a separate existence [between the two relata]: for instance, between the sense of touch (*tvagindriya*) and the body (*śarīra*). Indeed, the body is contained in the separate locus of its own parts independent of the sense of touch [which itself does not inhere in all the parts of the body]. And the sense of touch is contained in the separate locus [from a locus of the body] of its own parts, independent of the body.¹⁰ Accordingly conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is between the two [of the sense of touch and the body], inherence is not [between them].¹¹

[1.2] The relation between the eternal entities¹²

On the other hand, as to the eternal entities, separate existence [means] different

9 Both of two relata, the cloth and its component threads, have the state of residing in respective loci (*prthagāśrayāśrayitva*) which is one condition of separate existence (*yutasiddhi*), since the threads reside in the cotton fiber and the cloth resides in the threads. However, the locus of the cloth is the threads as the other relatum. That is to say, the cloth does not satisfy another condition, “independence from each other” (*parasparaparihāra*). Accordingly, separate existence is not found between the two relata: the cloth and its component threads. See the *Tippaṇa* (pp. 47,14–48,9): *tantupaṭayor hi prthagāśrayāśrayitvam asti tantūnām svāyāvācasamaśvetatvāt paṭasya tu tantusamaśvetatvāt paraṃ parasparaparihāro nāsti paṭasya tantuṣo eva samaśvetatvāt*.

10 According to the Vaiśeṣika, the sense of touch (*tvagindriya*) is not a part (*avayava*) of the body (*śarīra*). The *NK* (p. 161,4–5) refers to a part where the body inheres as follows: “... *śarīrasya haste samaśvetatvāt*.” [...] since the body is inherent in [its] hand.) Then, the *NK* (p. 38,11–13) says “*na ca pañcabhūtasamaśrayikāraṇatve śarīrasyaikaṭvam prāpnoti svabhāvacchedena bhedopapattēh. mānuṣaṃ śarīraṃ prthivyātmakam gandhavattvāt paramāṇulakṣaṇaprthivīvat ...*” (And if [the body] had the five elements for [its] inherent cause, the body could not be one only. The reason [for this] is that the diversity [of the body as the effect] is caused by the diversity of natural constitutions [composed of the five elements as the cause]. [We conclude that] the human body is composed of the earth (*prthivī*) since [the human body] has smell. Just like the earth in the form of atom.) With regard to the sense of touch, the *PDhS* (no. 53) says “*indriyam sarvaprāṇinām sparśopalambhakaṃ prthivyādyanabhibhūtair vāyuvāyavair ārabdham sarvaśarīravayūpi tvagindriyam*.” (The sense of organ [which is one of four products of air] causes all living beings to feel touch, is composed of the parts of air, which are not predominated by the earth etc., and is the sense of touch which is pervading all over the body.) The *NK* (p. 45,17–22) has the same contents as the *PDhS*: “*yat sarvaprāṇinām sparśopalambhakaṃ indriyam tat ... vāyuvāyavair ārabdham ... tvagindriyam iti samākhyā ...*” To sum up, the *NK* states that the body is composed of the earth and that the sense of touch is composed of the air (*vāyu*). Therefore, the body inheres in the parts—for instance, the hands of the body—which are composed of the earth atoms, whereas the sense of touch inheres in the parts which are composed of the air atoms. Moreover, to abide by the doctrine that a whole (*avayavin*) is one in nature, it is necessary that both of the parts (the natural constitution (*svabhāva*) of the whole) and the whole belong to the same class: earthness (*prthivīva*), waterness (*āptva*), fireness (*tejasva*), or airness (*vāyutva*). The sense of touch belongs to airness and the body belongs to earthness, so that the sense of touch is not a part of the body. It is just conjunct with the body. See the *PDhS*, no. 192: *tvagindriyaśarīrayoh prthaggatimatvām nāsti yuteṣv āśrayeṣu samaśyō 'stīti paraspareṇa saṃyogah siddhah*.

11 Regarding the argument in [1.1], see Shastri [1993: 117–120] and Bhattacharyya [1994: 19].

12 TEXT: *nityānām tu yutasiddhiḥ prthagavasthiḥ prthagamanayogyatā sā yayor nāsti tāv ayutasiddhau, tayor yah sambandhaḥ sa samaśyō yathākāśadravyatayor iti*.

residence [in space, or] the capability of separate locomotion (*prthagghanayogyatā*).¹³ It (separate existence) is not present between the two entities that are incapable of existing separately. The relation between such two entities is inherence. For instance, [there is inherence] between the ether (*ākāśa*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*).¹⁴

[2] Entities that stand as the superstratum and the substratum (*ādhāryādhārabhūta*)

[2.1] The relation between merit and pleasure¹⁵

If [inherence] were defined as, “the relation between entities that are incapable of existing separately,” the relation between merit (*dharma*) and pleasure (*sukha*), which has a character of the relationship of cause and effect,¹⁶ would also come to be inherence since there is no separate existence between these two [merit and pleasure]

13 As for “the capability of separate locomotion,” the *NK* (p. 160,7–9) defines and exemplifies it in the chapter of disjunction (*vibhāga*) as follows: “*dvayor ekasya vā parasparasamyogāvibhāga-hetubhūtakarmasamāvāyogyatā yutasiddhiḥ. dvayor paramāṅśor prthagghanam ākāśaparamāṅśor cānyatarasya prthagghanam iyaṃ tu nityānām.*” (Separate existence [means] that two [eternal entities] or one [of them] have the capability of having inherence of activity which consists of the cause of conjunction with, and disjunction from, the other. As for two atoms, there is a [mutually] independent locomotion; and as to the ether and the atom, there is a separate locomotion on one [atom] of the two. However, this [kind of separate existence] is in the eternal entities.) On the eternal ubiquitous entities, for instance the ether and the space (*dīś*), the *NK* (pp. 160,27–161,1) says “*vibhānām tu dvayor anyatarasya vā prthagghanābhāvān na paraspareṇa samyogo nāpi vibhāgaḥ ...*” (However, as to the ubiquitous entities, there is neither mutual conjunction [with the other] nor mutual disjunction [from the other], since there is no separate locomotion in one or two [of the ubiquitous entities].) In this connection, locomotion (*gamana*) is a kind of activity (*karman*) which is of five kinds: throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contraction, expansion, and locomotion. See the *PDhS*, no. 6: *utkṣepaṇāpakṣepaṇākuñcanaprasāraṇagamanāni pañcaiva karmāṇi*. Moreover, the *PDhS* (no. 329) explains ‘locomotion’ as follows: “locomotion is that which causes conjunction with and disjunction from a place in unfixed direction.” (*yad aniyatadik-pradeśasamyogāvibhāgākāraṇaṃ tad gamanam iti.*)

14 Both the ether and universal do not have locomotion, since activity inheres in the material substances (*mūrtadravyavṛttiva*) only. See the *PDhS* (no. 324). On the concept of “material substances,” the *NK* (p. 290,20–21) comments that “inherence in the material substances [means] inhering in the substances that have the delimited magnitude.” (*mūrtadravyavṛttivam avacchinna-parimāṇadravyavṛttivam.*) In addition, the ether has ultimate dimension (*paramamahatva*). See the *PDhS*, no. 19: *ākāśakāladigātmanām sarvagatatvaṃ paramamahatvaṃ sarvasamyogisamānadeśatvaṃ ca*. On the concept of “ultimate dimension,” the *NK* (p. 22,15–16) comments that “ultimate dimension [means] having unlimited magnitude.” (*paramamahatvaṃ iyattānavacchinna-parimāṇayogitvam.*) Regarding the argument in [1.2], see Shastri [1993: 119].

15 TEXT: *ayutasiddhyor sambandha ity ucyamāne, dharmasya sukhasya ca yāḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvvalakṣaṇāḥ sambandhaḥ so 'pi samavāyah prāpnoti, tayor āmaikāśritayor yutasiddhyabhāvāt. tadartham ādhāryādhārabhūtanām iti padam.*

16 On the relationship of cause and effect between merit and pleasure, see the *NK*, p. 260,3–4: ... *dharmādyapekṣād yad utpadyate tat sukham.* (That which is produced on the basis of [...] merit and so on is pleasure.)

that are residing in the same soul.¹⁷ Therefore, [in order to exclude the relation between merit and pleasure from the concept of inherence, Praśastapāda includes in the definition] the expression, “between entities that stand as the superstratum and the substratum.”¹⁸

[2.2] The relation between the ether and a bird¹⁹

However, the purpose [of including the expression, “between entities that stand as the superstratum and the substratum,” in the definition] is not to exclude the relation between the ether and a [flying] bird, since it (the relation between the ether and a flying bird) is excluded by virtue of the very expression, “entities that are incapable of existing separately.”²⁰

[3] A cause of the idea “this is here” (*ihapratyayahetu*)²¹

If it were so, the relation of the denoted and the denoter (*vācyavācakabhāva*) between the ether and the [articulated] word ‘ether’²² would be inherence. In order to exclude it (the relation of the denoted and the denoter) [from the concept of inherence, Praśastapāda includes the expression] “a cause of the idea ‘[this is] here’.” The reason [why the expression can exclude the relation] is that, in the case of the relation of the denoted and denoter, the meaning of the word is known from the word, but [the idea]

17 As defined in [1.1], separate existence (*yutasiddhi*) means the state, possessed by both of two relata, of residing in respective loci independently of each other. There is no separate existence between merit and pleasure, both of which are regarded as the relata of the cause and effect relationship, since they do not reside in respective loci that are themselves independent. That is to say, since each of merit and pleasure has the state of sharing a locus (soul) with the other (*sāmānādhikaranyā*), their loci are not respectively independent but the same.

18 Regarding the argument in [2.1], see Shastri [1993: 122] and Bhattacharyya [1994: 19–20].

19 TEXT: *na tv ākāśasakunisambandhanivṛttyartham* ⁽¹⁾*ayutasiddhāpadenaiva*⁽¹⁾ *tasya nirvartitatvāt*.
VARIANTS: (1) *S. ayutasiddhipadenāiva*.

20 In the chapter of disjunction, Śrīdhara admits that separate existence is between the ether and a [flying] bird as follows: “[Praśastapāda says that] ‘to the contrary, as to the transient entities, separate existence [means] inhering in separate substratum’. [I will comment on it:] as to the transient entities, two [transient entities] or one [of them] inhere in respective loci independently of each other. ‘Inhering’ [in the statement by Praśastapāda means] residing of two entities in respective loci. Moreover, as to a [flying] bird and the ether, the other entity of the [flying] bird resides in a different locus.” (The *NK*, p. 160,11–13: *anityānām tu yuteṣv āśrayeṣu samavāyo yutasiddhiḥ. devayor anyatarasya evā parasparaparihārenānyatrāśraye samavāyo yutasiddhir anityānām. devayoh pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvam* ⁽¹⁾*samavāyah*⁽¹⁾. *śakunyākāśayoś cānyatarasya śakuneh pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvam*.) The O edition (p. 384,2) shows variants with regard to (1): *ghaṭapatayoh*. Regarding the relation between the ether and a [flying] bird, the *Vj* argues that it is excluded by the expressions, “the superstratum and the substratum.” See the *Vj*, vol. I, p. 25,15–18.

21 TEXT: *evam apy ākāśasyākāśapadasya ca vācyavācakabhāvaḥ samavāyah syāt. tannivṛttyartham ihapratyayahetur iti. vācyavācakabhāve hi tasmāc chabdāt tadartho jñāyate na tv ihedam iti*.

22 As an example under the relation “the denoted and the denoter,” the *Vj* also shows the relation between the ether and the [articulated] word ‘ether’. Regarding “the [articulated] word ‘ether’,” the *Vj* uses the Sanskrit term ‘*ākāśabda*’, whereas the *NK* uses ‘*ākāśapada*’. See the *Vj*, vol. I, p. 26,13.

“this is here” is not [known from the word].²³

[4] Entities that are incapable of existing separately (*ayutasiddha*)

[4.1] The relation between the bowl and the fruit of jujube²⁴

[If inherence were defined as “the relation], which is a cause of the idea ‘[this is] here,’ between entities that stand as the superstratum and the substratum,”] the relation between the bowl and the fruit of jujube could not be excluded [from the concept of inherence]. Therefore, [Prašastapāda places the expression in the definition,] “between entities that are incapable of existing separately.”²⁵

[4.2] Objection to the expression *ayutasiddha*²⁶

On this point, some people²⁷ state a dilemma on the expression of ‘*ayutasiddha*’, [that is to say, does it mean that] two separable entities do *not* exist, or that two *inseparable* entities exist?²⁸ If [it means that] two separable entities do not exist, what is the relation between the two entities? [In this case, there is not any relation between them] since two possessors (relata) of property (relation) do not exist.²⁹ If [it means that] two inseparable entities exist, in this case too, what ever would be the relation [between two inseparable entities]? [There is not any relation between them] since [the two inseparable entities] do not exist as being different entities at all. Indeed,

23 The narrow application (*avyāpti*) of the definition of inherence is pointed out in this case. That is to say, although the Vaiśeṣika doctrine admits that the relation between the ether and the articulated word “ether” is inherence, the relation is excluded from the concept of inherence by the expression “a cause of the idea ‘[this is] here.’” However, even though the definition has the defect of narrow application, it is regarded as a correct definition in Indian philosophy. On this point, see Matilal [1990 (1985): 176–202] and Sato [1995: 25–27]. Moreover, regarding the argument in [3], see Shastri [1993: 123] and Bhattacharyya [1994: 21–22].

24 TEXT: *ādihāryādihārabbhūtanām ihapratyayahetur iti kuṇḍabadarasambandho na vyavacchidyate tadartham ayutasiddhānām iti.*

25 The relation between the bowl and the fruit of jujube subsists between entities that stand as the contained (the fruit of jujube) and the container (the bowl), and causes the idea, “the fruit of jujube is in the bowl.” However, this relation does not subsist between entities that are incapable of existing separately, since the bowl and the fruit of jujube are entities that are capable of existing separately (*yutasiddha*).

26 TEXT: *atra kecid⁽¹⁾ ayutasiddhapadam¹ vikalpayanti kiṃ yutau na siddhau āhosvid ayutau siddhau, yadī yutau na siddhau kas tayoh sambandho dharmiṇor abhāvāt. athāyutau siddhau tathāpi kaḥ sambandho ’prthaksiddhatvād eva. bhinnayor hi sambandho yathā kuṇḍabadarayor iti.*
VARIANTS: (1) R, S, *ayutasiddhipadam*.

27 According to the *Nyāyakusumodgama* (p. 50,18), which is a commentary on the NK, “some people” (*kecid*) indicates the propounder of identity relation (*tādātmya*), who does not tolerate inherence relation. (*na hi bhavati rūpe rasa iti samavāyam asahamānāms tādātmyavādina utthāpayanti atra kecid iti.*)

28 The different point of two alternative views for the expression ‘*ayutasiddha*’ is that which the negative participle ‘*a*’ modifies—*siddha* or *yuta*. In the former case, ‘*ayutasiddha*’ means that two separable entities do *not* exist. In the later case, it means that two *inseparable* entities exist.

29 In this case, property (*dharma*) stands for a relation and property-possessors (*dharmin*) stand for the relata (two entities).

there is a relation between two distinct entities, for instance, between the bowl and the fruit of jujube.

[4.3] Answer to the objection³⁰

Others³¹ do not accept it (the statement of dilemma on the expression of ‘*ayutasiddha*’ mentioned above). Indeed this (the expression of ‘*ayutasiddha*’) does not have such a meaning [as “two separable entities do not exist.”] The reason [for this] is that “two separable entities do not exist” [means that two separable entities] do not arise, so that inherence is not recognized between non-beings. Moreover, this (the expression of ‘*ayutasiddha*’) does not have such a meaning [as “two inseparable entities exist”] since “two inseparable entities exist” [means that] two entities exist with identity. Indeed, if [two entities] were identical, there would be a single entity, not two entities, since the property of possessing a nature of two entities has a character of absence of identity [of two entities]. And [in the case of inherence, both relata] are not in reality an identical entity.³² The reasons [for this] are that both configurations (*ākāra*) of the two [entities] appear in a different form (*rūpa*) from each other,³³ [and that] the very property of being known by cognition of different configurations is the character of difference. Otherwise, it would be impossible to separate between difference (*bheda*) and identity (*abheda*). Therefore, ‘*ayutasiddhi*’ does not [mean] identity (*svarūpābheda*) [of two entities] either, but [the expression of] ‘*ayutasiddhānām*’ means between entities that do not reside in respective loci independently of each other. And this being the case, it would not be impossible for a relation to exist [between entities that are incapable of existing separately] since a different nature [in each of two inseparable entities] is possible and a close mutual contact between different entities is not

30 TEXT: *tadapare na* (¹*mṛṣanti*¹). *na hy* (²*asyāyam artho*²), *yutau na siddhau na niṣpannāv iti asatoḥ samavāyānabhīyupagamāt. nāpy asyāyam arthaḥ, ayutau siddhāv* (³*ekātmakau siddhāv*³) *iti ekātmakatve hy ekam eva vastu syān nobhayam, parasparātmakatvābhāvcalakṣaṇatvād ubhaya rūpatāyāḥ. na ca tadekaṃ vastu paramārthataḥ. parasparavilakṣaṇena rūpeṇa tayor ākārayoḥ pratibhāsanāt, vilakṣaṇākārabuddhivedyatvasyaiva bhedalakṣaṇatvāt. anyathā bhedaḥbhedaḥsvasthānupapattēḥ. tasmān na svarūpābhedo ’py ayutasiddhiḥ kiṃ tv ayutasiddhānām iti parasparaparīhāreṇa pṛthagāśrayānāśritānām ity arthaḥ. tathā ca sati sambandho nānupapannaḥ, svarūpabhedasya sambhāvād bhinnayoḥ ca parasparopasleṣasya dahanāyapīṇḍayor eva vinā sambandhenāsambhāvāt.*

VARIANTS: (1) R, S, *mṛṣanti*; (2) S, *ayam asyārtho*; (3) R, S, omit.

31 The *Pañjikā* (p. 50,16–17), which is a commentary on the NK, interprets ‘*apare* (others)’ as the Vaiśeṣikas (*apare vaiśeṣikāḥ*).

32 According to the *Pañjikā* (p. 51,16), the word ‘*tad*’ in “*na ca tadekaṃ vastu*” signifies nature (*svarūpa*) of two entities, for instance, the threads and the cloth (*tad iti tantuṣu pataḥ svarūpam*).

33 On this portion, the *Nyāyakusumodgama* (p. 50,23–24) comments that “the cloth is in the threads” [and] “cowness is in the cows,” since both entities that are incapable of existing separately, [for instance,] the parts and the whole [and] the universal and the possessor of universal, appear as possessing the properties of number and so on which are inconsistent with the other, it is unsuitable that [both entities] are identical. (*parasparavilakṣaṇeneti iha tantuṣu pataḥ iha goṣu gotvam ityevam ayutasiddhāyor avayavāvayavīnora jātijātimatoḥ parasparaviruddhasaṅkhyādīdharmavattayā pratibhāsanād ekatvam ayuktam.*)

possible without a relation, like that between the fire and the iron ball.³⁴

[4.4] Difference between inherence and conjunction³⁵

However, the only difference [between conjunction and inherence] is as follows:³⁶ [In the case of conjunction,] after the fire occurs, [the fire] has a relation to the iron ball.³⁷ On the other hand, in this case of [inherence], being born by the power of its own causes, it (the effect or the product)³⁸ is simultaneously related to it (the cause).³⁹ For instance, the action of cutting off [is related to] what is to be cut off.⁴⁰ [We have done] enough of [this consideration of inherence].

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NK: Nyāyakandali (S).

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Nyāyakandali (O) of Śrīdhara, in *Nyāyakandali being a Commentary on Prāśastapādabhāṣya, with Three Sub-*

34 Regarding the compound of *dahanāyahaṅpiṇḍayor*, Honda [1990: 27] translates it into “between the two firing iron balls, not “between the fire and the iron ball.” Although conjunction is found in each case, I translate it into “between the fire and the iron ball” as Jhā [1982 (1915): 34] does. In addition, see the following translation in [4.4] which argues for the relationship between the fire and the iron ball not between the two firing iron balls. Moreover, regarding the argument in [4.2] and [4.3], see Shastri [1993: 123–124].

35 TEXT: *iyāms tu viśeṣo, vahnir utpatteḥ paścād ayaḥpiṇḍena saha sambaddhyate, iha tu svakāraṇasāmāthyād upajāyamānam eva tatra sambaddhyate, yathā chidīkriyā chedyenety alam.*

36 Jhā [1982 (1915): 34] translates this portion into “The only difference however between ordinary relationship and Inherence is this.” He does not explain what “ordinary relationship” indicates. Following Honda [1990: 27] and the commentaries on the *NK*, I understand that this portion mentions the only difference between ‘conjunction’ and inherence. The *Nyāyakusumodgama* (p. 51,25–26) comments that “[the phrase of] ‘however, the only difference’ means that there is not a fusion, which has a state of having not fused formerly, between both the threads and the cloth, like the fire and the iron ball.” (*iyāms tv iti na tantupatayor dahanāyahaṅpiṇḍavād aprāptir pūrvikā prāptir ity arthaḥ.*) This comment brings the definition of conjunction in the *PDhS*. On the definition of conjunction, the *NK* (p. 146,8–10) comments as follows: “[The *PDhS* defines that] ‘conjunction is fusion of two substances that were not fused’. [I will comment on it:] that which is the fusion [or] the close contact with each other of two substances that were not fused formerly is conjunction. [The expression of ‘two substances’ that were not fused’ aims to distinguish [conjunction] from inherence.” (*aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ samyogaḥ. pūrvam aprāptayor dravyayoḥ paścād yo prāptiḥ parasparasamśleṣaḥ sa samyogaḥ, aprāptayor iti samavāyavyavacchedārtham.*)

37 See note 34.

38 For instance, the cloth is applicable for the effect or the product. See the *Pañjikā*, p. 51,18: *upajāyamānam eveti paṭādi.*

39 For instance, the threads are applicable for the cause. See the *Pañjikā*, p. 51,18: *tatreit tantvādau.* On the “theory of simultaneity” and the “dilemma about being and non-being” in reference to the term *sāmāthyā*, see Halbfass [1993 (1992): 194–196].

40 Regarding this instance, Shastri [1993: 121–122] explains as follows: “the act of felling (*chidi kriyā*) emerges simultaneously with its relations with the tree.”

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